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Losing Your Head in the Washer –  
Why the Brainwashing Defense  
Can Be a Complete Defense in  
Criminal Cases 
 
Rebecca Emory

 
 
Introduction 
 
“Brainwashing” is not a new concept, not even in the legal world.  
In the field of psychology, the term has been used over time in the 
studies of prisoners of war and religious cults.
1
  In the field of law, 
individual criminal defendants have tried, though unsuccessfully, to use 
brainwashing as a criminal defense.
2
  Nevertheless, it is still disputed 
whether brainwashing should play a role at trial and, if so, how big a role 
this should be.  Some have proposed that brainwashing should only be 
used as a mitigating factor in criminal cases.
3
  However, when examined 
against other defenses, such as duress and insanity, an argument can be 
made that brainwashing could be as successful and complete a defense to 
a crime as these other defenses. 
Furthermore, an argument can be made that a potential 
brainwashing defense should fall, though disputed, under the insanity 
defense.  Both defenses have similarities.  Brainwashing can be 
categorized as a mental defect or disease and it can be argued that the 
defendant cannot distinguish between right and wrong when he or she is 
committing the act.
4
  Like insanity, brainwashing should also be 
categorized as an excuse and not a justification for committing a crime.  
The difference between a justification and an excuse is crucial.  Though 
a defendant is acquitted in both instances, “claims of excuse concede that 
 
   J.D., Pace University School of Law, 2010. 
1. Richard Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Toward a Defense 
Theory for the Coercively Persuaded (“Brainwashed”) Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1 
(1978-1979). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
3. See Ida-Gaye Warburton, The Commandeering of Free Will: Brainwashing as a 
Legitimate Defense, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 73 (2003). 
4. James Dao, Mental Health Experts Call Sniper Defendant Brainwashed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at A38. 
1
1338 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
the act is wrongful, but seek to avoid the attribution of the act to the 
actor.”5  For example, a crime committed in self-defense is “both legally 
and morally correct” and is therefore deemed a justification.6  However, 
an excuse “is not justified, since it should not be encouraged, but is still 
exempt from criminal liability due to society‟s understanding of the 
grave situation in which the actor has found himself.”7  The courts do not 
concentrate on the specific act done by the perpetrator, but rather focus 
“on the circumstances of the act and the actor‟s personal capacity to 
avoid either an intentional wrong or the taking of an excessive risk.”8  
Insanity is rarely used as a defense at trial because most juries are 
reluctant to believe it.
9
  Yet, it is still an available defense.  The 
brainwashing defense has not yet been successful; however, this does not 
mean it should not be included as a valid defense.  The success rate of a 
defense should not guide the implementation of it.  In the past, society 
and society‟s morals have called for certain legal defenses based on 
scientific theories, even in circumstances where the scientific community 
was reluctant to acknowledge them.
10
 
There have been two highly publicized cases presenting the 
brainwashing defense: the Patty Hearst case involving a kidnapped 
heiress who robbed banks with her kidnappers,
11
 and the D.C. sniper 
case, involving a teenager claiming to be “indoctrinated” into killing 
random people from his car.
12
  In both cases the defense failed for 
various reasons.
13
  Nevertheless, these cases provide stepping stones for 
a potential brainwashing defense in the future.  Defendants who have 
allegedly been brainwashed are often categorized as victims rather than 
perpetrators.
14
  “Sentencing can promote beneficial effects for society by 
deterring future harms and incapacitating only those who would visit 
such harms upon the polity.”15  Yet, in cases where the defendant has 
 
5. Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Torturing Debate on Torture, 29 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 1, 40 (2008). 
6. Boaz Sangero, In Defense of Self-Defence in Criminal Law; and on Killing in 
Self-Defence—A Reply to Fiona Leverick, 44 No. 6 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN 4 (2008).  
7. Id. 
8. Wattad, supra note 5, at 40. 
9. Fox Butterfield, Dispute Over Insanity Defense Is Revived in Murder Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at A10. 
  10. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 24. 
11. United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
12. Mike M. Ahlers, Jury Convicts Malvo of Sniper Murder, CNN LAW CENTER, 
Dec. 19, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/18/sprj.dcsp.malvo.trial/index.html. 
13. See infra Part III.C-D.   
14. Delgado, supra note 1, at 7. 
15. O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 
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raised the insanity defense, deterrence is shown to be ineffective.
16
  
Besides retribution, there is no basis for imprisonment.
17
  This is also 
true in brainwashing cases.  As in insanity cases, instead of putting 
brainwashed defendants behind bars, they should enter a treatment 
program for rehabilitation.  Many states have implemented statutes that 
will place defendants, who have been acquitted by reason of insanity, in 
medical or psychiatric hospitals.  For instance, the “detention under D.C. 
Code § 24-301(d) is not punitive but rather serves a two-fold purpose: (1) 
to protect the public and the subject, and (2) to afford a place and a 
procedure to treat and, if possible, to rehabilitate the subject.”18  As a 
result, these statutes should also apply to brainwashed defendants. 
This note will demonstrate how brainwashing can be a complete 
defense to a crime and therefore should be adopted into the Model Penal 
Code under the insanity defense.  Part I provides a brief introduction to 
the background of brainwashing and the closely related Stockholm 
Syndrome.  Part II analyzes two existing defenses, duress and insanity, in 
which scholars have tried to place the brainwashing defense.  Further, 
Part II also provides an analysis of two famous cases, the Patty Hearst 
case
19
 and the D.C. sniper case,
20
 which have both introduced the 
brainwashing defense at trial.  Part III presents the elements of the 
brainwashing defense and explains why the Model Penal Code should 
adopt it.  In addition, Part III offers the existing criticism to the 
brainwashing defense.  Finally, Part IV concludes that the criticisms are 
outweighed by the benefits of the brainwashing defense. 
 
I. Background 
   
A. Brainwashing 
 
To understand the concept of “brainwashing,” it is necessary to 
understand where it comes from and what it actually means.  Edward 
Hunter, a journalist for the Chicago Tribune, first introduced the idea of 
“brainwashing” in 1951.21  In response to the behavior of American 
Prisoners in China and North Korea, Hunter tried to explain why these 
 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1314 (2007). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Collins v. Cameron, 377 F.2d 945, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
19. United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
20. Mohammed v. State, 934 A.2d 1059 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009). 
21. Warburton, supra note 3, at 76. 
3
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“American prisoners of war (“POWs”) converted to Communism . . . as 
a result of coercion.”22  Though the threat of force was present, it was the 
isolation and mind techniques that were used to “brainwash” these 
prisoners.
23
  Psychologist Robert Jay Lifton, through his studies of 
POWs, found that there were several steps in brainwashing.
24
  Later 
psychologists reviewed Lifton‟s work and characterized the steps as 
three distinct stages: “breaking down the self, introducing the possibility 
of salvation, and rebuilding the self.”25  The first stage deals with self-
doubt.  The indoctrinator or agent attacks a person‟s identity until the 
“breaking point” which leads to a complete “identity crises.”26  During 
the second stage, the agent attaches the person‟s feeling of guilt to his old 
belief system.
27
  This leads to a “psychological rejection of his former 
identity.”28  During the third stage, the agent rebuilds the person‟s belief 
system and gives him a new identity.
29
 
According to Lifton, “the process which gave rise to the name” 
brainwashing was “the official Chinese Community program of szu-
hsiang kai–tsao . . . .”30  Translated, “szu-hsiang kai-tsao” means 
“„ideological remodeling,‟ „ideological reform.‟”31  Today, common 
synonyms for “brainwashing” are “coercive persuasion” and “thought 
reform,” which define the “forcible indoctrination process designed to 
induce the subject to abandon existing political, religious, or social 
beliefs in favor of a rigid system imposed by the indoctrinator.”32  
Moreover, the indoctrinator achieves his goal by “isolation, physiological 
depletion, assertions of authority, guilt manipulation, peer pressure, and 
cognitive dissonance.”33 
Although the American Psychological Association (“APA”) has 
declined to rule “brainwashing” as a scientific theory in regards to 
 
22. Id. 
23. Julia Layton, How Brainwashing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, May 10, 
2006, http://people.howstuffworks.com/brainwashing.htm/printable. 
24. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM 
– A STUDY OF “BRAINWASHING” IN CHINA 65-85 (1961). 
25. Layton, supra note 23. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. LIFTON, supra note 24, at 4. 
31. Id. 
32. Delgado, supra note 1, at n.1. 
33. Id. at 2. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/11
2010] LOSING YOUR HEAD IN THE WASHER 1341 
religious cults,
34
 there have been experts who believe that 
“brainwashing” is a legitimate theory.35  In the legal field, judges have 
allowed experts to testify on the brainwashing defense, while still 
instructing the jury that it is a controversial theory.
36
  Nevertheless, the 
split in the scientific community undermines the brainwashing theory 
and therefore also “undermines the validity and admissibility of research 
on this issue.”37 
 
B. Stockholm Syndrome 
 
A mental disease that is widely recognized in the scientific 
community is the Stockholm Syndrome.  In United States v. Chancey, 
expert Dr. Ochberg “described the „Stockholm Syndrome‟ as a 
psychological phenomenon whereby a hostage develops positive feelings 
for his or her captor.”38  Further, he states “that the theory was ten years 
old and in the developmental stage, but was accepted by a large 
percentage of psychiatrists who had been introduced to it.”39  Although 
this syndrome was known beforehand, the name “Stockholm Syndrome” 
originated in 1973 after a bank robbery that took place in Stockholm, 
Sweden:  “The two bank robbers held four hostages, three women and 
one man, for the next 131 hours.  The hostages were strapped with 
dynamite and held in a bank vault until finally rescued.”40  Once rescued, 
the hostages defended the robbers and were even afraid of the police.
41
  It 
was evident that “the hostages had „bonded‟ emotionally with their 
captors.”42 
Experts and researchers have identified several symptoms and 
behaviors attributed to the Stockholm Syndrome: “[p]ositive feelings by 
 
34. Massimo Introvigne, “Liar, Liar”: Brainwashing, CESNUR and APA, CENTER 
FOR STUDIES ON NEW RELIGIONS, 1998, http://www.cesnur.org/testi/gandow_eng.htm. 
35. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass‟n, 762 P.2d 46, 54 (Cal. 1988) (“Some highly 
respected authorities conclude brainwashing exists and is remarkably effective.”) (citing 
ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM: A STUDY OF 
“BRAINWASHING” IN CHINA (1961); EDGAR SCHEIN, COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961)), 
superseded on other grounds by statute. 
36. Id. at 54. 
37. Warburton, supra note 3, at 80. 
38. United States v. Chancey, 715 F.2d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 1983). 
39. Id. 
40. Joseph M. Carver, Love and Stockholm Syndrome: The Mystery of Loving an 
Abuser, MENTAL HEALTH MATTERS, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.mental-health-
matters.com/articles/article.php?artID=469. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
5
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the victim toward the abuser/controller;”43 “[n]egative feelings by the 
victim toward family, friends, or authorities trying to rescue/support 
them or win their release;”44 “[s]upport of the abuser‟s reasons and 
behaviors;”45 “[p]ositive feelings by the abuser toward the victim;”46 
“[s]upportive behaviors by the victim, at times helping the abuser;”47 and 
the “[i]nability to engage in behaviors that may assist in their release or 
detachment.”48  In the Stockholm scenario, the hostages showed signs of 
most of these symptoms.  One of the female hostages even became 
“engaged to one of the criminals and another developed a legal defense 
fund to aid in their criminal defense fees.”49 
The Stockholm Syndrome is closely related to the brainwashing 
process.  Most of the Stockholm Syndrome symptoms can be found in 
brainwashed persons as well.  In the famous Patty Hearst case,
50
 for 
example, the defense tried to show that “Hearst had been „brainwashed‟ 
and suffered from what has been variously called the „Stockholm 
Syndrome.‟”51  The idea was that as a result of brainwashing, Hearst 
developed the Stockholm Syndrome.
52
  Furthermore, both the Stockholm 
Syndrome and brainwashing are found in similar situations, specifically 
in “hostage, prisoner, or abusive situations . . . .”53  The groups that are 
mostly affected include abused children, battered and abused women, 
prisoners of war, cult members, and criminal hostages.
54
 
 
II.  Duress, Insanity, and the Disputed Brainwashing Defense 
 
When used, defense counsel has placed the brainwashing defense 
under two different categories: the duress defense and the insanity 
defense.  For instance, in the Patty Hearst case, the defense counsel 
stressed that brainwashing should fall within the duress defense because 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
51. Douglas O. Linder, Patty Hearst Trial (1976), UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-
KANSAS CITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 2007, 
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hearst/hearstdolaccount.html. 
52. Id. 
53. Carver, supra note 40. 
54. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/11
2010] LOSING YOUR HEAD IN THE WASHER 1343 
of the element of coercion.
55
  However, the defense counsel in the D.C. 
sniper case used the insanity defense, arguing that the teenager was 
brainwashed and could not distinguish between right and wrong.
56
  
Although both approaches failed, the brainwashing defense is more 
similar to the insanity defense because of the voluntary act that is 
committed. 
 
A. Duress 
 
Duress is a valid defense when the actor commits a crime because 
“he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force 
against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”57  Although 
the actor commits the crime voluntarily and intentionally, he does not do 
so by free will.
58
  Under duress, the actor does not choose to engage in a 
certain behavior but is influenced by an “outside force.”59  Furthermore, 
“where a defendant acts under duress, she lacks any semblance of a 
meaningful choice.  In that sense her choice is not free.”60  Therefore, 
duress shows “the resemblance to [the] lack of mens rea . . . .”61 
In addition, most jurisdictions include the element of “immediacy” 
to the duress defense.
62
  Immediacy refers to the “threat of [bodily] 
injury.”63  For example, “a veiled threat of future unspecified harm, as 
the threat „to take care of‟, and „not to forget‟ is not the equivalent of an 
immediate threat of death or severe bodily injury.”64  Immediacy poses a 
 
55. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. at 870. 
56. Dao, supra note 4. 
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (2001).  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2)-(4) 
(2001), for further provisions under § 2.09 which limit the use of this defense.  “(2) The 
defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly places himself in a 
situation in which it was probable that he would be subject to duress.  The defense is also 
unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever 
negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged.  (3) It is not a defense 
that a woman acted on the command of her husband, unless she acted under such 
coercion as would establish a defense under this Section. . . .  (4) When the conduct of the 
actor would otherwise be justifiable under Section 3.02, this Section does not preclude 
such defense.”  Id. 
58. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 24 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
59. United States v. Grainger, 239 F. App‟x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(distinguishing between necessity and duress).  
60. Dixon, 548 U.S. at 23 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. at 24. 
62. See, e.g., United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1984). 
63. Id. 
64. R.I. Recreation Ctr. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949) 
7
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major problem for the brainwashing defense because the initial 
immediate threat that existed may not be present at the time the crime is 
executed.
65
  Coercion exists in almost any brainwashing scenario, usually 
at its initiation.
66
  If a crime is committed during this period, a defendant 
can use the duress defense in his favor.  However, brainwashed 
defendants tend to commit crimes after this initial stage, which can be 
problematic for any defense based on duress.
67
 
 
B. Insanity 
 
For the insanity defense to apply, it is necessary to prove that the 
defendant was “insane” when he committed the crime.  For the 
brainwashing defense, it would therefore be irrelevant when the initial 
coercion happened, as long as the defendant was still brainwashed when 
he committed the crime.  Yet, even the insanity defense has been 
criticized in the past.
68
  Some states have gone so far as to abolish this 
defense completely.
69
  Moreover, the insanity defense is only “employed 
in fewer than [one] percent of criminal cases and is successful in only 
about one quarter of these trials, according to a study by the American 
Psychiatric Association.”70  Nevertheless, it is a valid defense in most 
states.  Most of these states still follow the 1843 definition of insanity.  In 
the English M’Naghten case, the bench ruled: 
 
[T]he jurors ought to be told . . . that to establish a 
defen[s]e on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly 
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the 
party accused was laboring under such a defect of 
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did 
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was 
wrong.
71
 
 
(emphasis added). 
65. Delgado, supra note 1, at 8. 
66. Id. 
67. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
68. Butterfield, supra note 9. 
69. Id. (stating that, by 1996, Montana, Utah and Idaho had abolished the insanity 
defense); see also THINKING ABOUT THE INSANITY DEFENSE 6 (Ellsworth Lapham Fersch 
ed., 2005) (stating that Montana, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, and Kansas have abolished the 
insanity defense). 
70. Butterfield, supra note 9. 
71. M‟Naghten‟s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718722 (1843). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/11
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This definition goes to the necessity “of understanding the nature and 
quality” of the act.72  If a defendant does not understand that what he did 
was wrong, there is no reason, under the theories of punishment, to 
incarcerate him. 
The Model Penal Code‟s definition of insanity is similar to the 
M‟Naghten rule: Insanity is a legitimate defense when “[a] person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result 
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirement of law.”73  Furthermore, evidence of a 
mental disease or defect “is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove 
that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element 
of the offense.”74  Although there might be an aspect of “free will” in the 
person‟s actions, “it does show the absence of a „vicious will.‟”75 
The main distinction between the duress and insanity defense is that 
duress requires the element of coercion.
76
  Moreover, a jury is probably 
more likely to believe that a defendant committed a crime under duress 
than due to insanity.
77
  Jurors can relate better to a situation of duress 
than insanity.  For example, it is easy for a juror to imagine why 
someone robbed a bank when another person threatened to kill him or his 
family.  However, it is more difficult to imagine that someone heard a 
voice in his head that told him to rob a bank.  Additionally, several issues 
arise with the insanity defense.  For example, the issue of legal versus 
moral insanity has bothered courts in the past.
78
  It has also been difficult 
to find an adequate definition for a “mental disease or defect.”79  “Most 
courts seem to assume that „mental disease‟ for purposes of the insanity 
defense is a legal, not a medical concept,”80 therefore the legal concept 
 
72. Butterfield, supra note 9. 
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001). 
74. Id. § 4.02(1). 
75. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 24 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
76. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.09(1), 4.01(1) (2001). 
77. See Steven K. Erickson, Mind Over Morality, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1555, 1561 
(2007) (explaining that “the take-home message of the Hearst case is the calculated tactic 
by the defense to pursue a duress claim instead of an insanity one presumably in the 
hopes that the jury would better receive it”). 
78. See, e.g., State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45 (N.J. 1963). 
79. SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 895 (8th ed. 2007). 
80. Id. 
9
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should also guide its definition. 
There are three different approaches as to what constitutes a “mental 
disease.”81  These approaches include the McDonald v. United States 
approach,
82
 the American Psychiatric Association approach,
83
 and the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) approach.84  The McDonald 
approach states that a “mental disease or defect includes any abnormal 
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional 
processes and substantially impairs behavior controls.”85  Under this 
standard, brainwashing could be categorized as a mental disease.  
Through certain brainwashing techniques, such as “isolation, 
physiological depletion, assertions of authority, guilt manipulation, peer 
pressure, and cognitive dissonance,”86 the indoctrinator shapes the mind 
of his victim, which substantially affects his mental processes and 
impairs behavior controls. 
The second approach, by the American Psychiatric Association, is 
more stringent.  A “mental disease” is defined as “severely abnormal 
mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person‟s 
perception or understanding of reality and that are not attributable 
primarily to the voluntary ingestion of alcohol or other psychoactive 
substances.”87  It is unlikely that brainwashing would be considered a 
mental disease under this standard because words, such as “severely” and 
“grossly” are very high standards to meet.  Nevertheless, since most 
courts look at insanity from a legal perspective, this approach will 
probably not be used that often. 
The third approach, by the ABA, is similar to the McDonald 
approach.  A “mental disease” is defined as the “(i) impairments of mind, 
whether enduring or transitory, or, (ii) mental retardation … which 
substantially affected the mental or emotional processes of the defendant 
at the time of the alleged offense.”88  Again, under this approach, 
 
81. Id. 
82. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
83. KADISH, supra note 79, at 896 (citing Insanity Defense Workgroup, American 
Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 
681, 681-88 (1980)). 
84. Id. (citing ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: MENTAL HEALTH § 7-6.1(a) 
(1983)). 
85. McDonald, 312 F.2d at 851. 
86. Delgado, supra note 1, at 2 (citations omitted). 
87. KADISH, supra note 79, at 896 (citing Insanity Defense Workgroup, American 
Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 
681, 681-88 (1980)). 
88. ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: MENTAL HEALTH § 7-6.1(a) (1983). 
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brainwashing would, most likely, be considered a mental disease.  The 
indoctrinator has impaired the brainwashed mind to the extent that the 
person‟s mental processes have been substantially affected.  It follows 
naturally that being legally insane is enough to find that a defendant has 
a mental disease or defect and, as a result, the McDonald or ABA 
definition of “mental disease or defect” should be followed.  
Consequently, the legal approach should also be adhered to for the other 
elements of the defense, such as “wrong” and “insane.”  For example, 
courts have been struggling with the meaning of “wrong” in insanity 
cases.
89
  The difference between morally wrong and legally wrong is 
evident.  Though some courts use morally wrong as a guideline,
90
 the 
standard should be the same for all elements.  Therefore, the “[i]nsanity 
acquittal requires the defendant to be unaware that his conduct was 
legally wrong.”91 
Courts are reluctant to expand the idea of duress beyond the 
immediate threat of harm.  As previously mentioned, there are two 
highly publicized cases that have used the brainwashing defense.  
Though in both cases the defense ultimately failed, the case analyses will 
demonstrate that linking brainwashing to the insanity defense makes 
sense and can be successful in the future.  In the Patty Hearst case, there 
were indicia that she acted out of free will while committing the bank 
robbery.
92
  Free will was deadly to the defense because her counsel 
linked it to the duress defense.  If the defense counsel had not invoked 
brainwashing through duress, whether or not her actions constituted free 
will would have been irrelevant.  In the D.C. sniper case, there was 
evidence that the teenager rejected his mentor‟s plan and even tried to 
commit suicide.
93
  Showing signs of unwillingness undermines the idea 
that the defendant could not distinguish between right and wrong.  In 
both cases, without this evidence, the brainwashing defense might have 
proved successful. 
 
 
89. Id. at 891; see also State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983) (en banc). 
90. See People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2000), superseded by statute, CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1054 (West 2010), as recognized in Verdin v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d 
1250 (Cal. 2008). 
91. KADISH, supra note 79, at 891. 
92. Linder, supra note 51. 
93. Dao, supra note 4. 
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C. The Case of Patty Hearst 
 
In the 1970s, the counsel for Patty Hearst drew attention to the 
brainwashing defense in a highly publicized case.  On February 4, 1974, 
nineteen-year-old Patty Hearst, heiress to the Hearst Corporation, 
“own[ing] a chain of newspapers, magazines and radio and TV 
stations,”94 was kidnapped while in her Berkeley apartment in 
California.
95
  The group responsible for her kidnapping was a radical 
group known as the Symbionese Liberation Army (“SLA”).96  According 
to the FBI, “the SLA wanted nothing less than to incite a guerrilla war 
against the U.S. government and destroy what they called the „capitalist 
state.‟”97  The SLA‟s goals were “closing prisons, ending monogamy, 
and eliminating „all other institutions that have made and sustained 
capitalism.‟”98  Patty Hearst was the perfect victim.  She came from a 
very affluent and influential family, and therefore the kidnapping brought 
the desired media attention the SLA had hoped for.
99
 
The SLA ordered the Hearst family to create a food donation 
program.
100
  Hearst‟s father complied with the order and established the 
“People in Need program and donated about $ [two] million.”101  Yet, 
many problems arose and, in an audio message, Hearst condemned her 
father‟s program.102  Additionally, her parents repeatedly tried to rescue 
their daughter but two months after the initial kidnapping, Patty Hearst 
“announced in a[nother] taped message that she had repudiated her 
former lifestyle, and was determined to „stay and fight‟ beside her 
captors . . . .”103  Instead of coming home, Hearst helped the SLA commit 
many crimes, including robbing the Hibernia Bank in San Francisco, 
 
94. Patty Hearst Profile, CNN PEOPLE IN THE NEWS, 2001, 
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/hearst/profile.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2009). 
95. FBI Headline Archive, A Byte Out of History: The Patty Hearst Kidnapping, 
Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/feb09/hearst_020409.html (last visited Feb. 6, 
2009). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Linder, supra note 51. 
99. FBI Headline Archive, supra note 95. 
100. Linder, supra note 51 (“The food giveaway program was fraught with 
problems.  In some distribution locations, rioting and fraud hampered efforts, [sic]  On 
February 22 at a distribution site in West Oakland, rioting led to dozens of injuries and 
arrests.”).  
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
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which left three people injured.
104
  It took the police over one year until 
they finally captured Hearst at her San Francisco apartment on 
September 18, 1975.
105
 
Though Hearst‟s mother categorized her daughter as a kidnapping 
victim,
106
 Hearst was charged with “assault with intent to commit 
murder, assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, and kidnapping.”107  
Hearst‟s main defense was duress.108  She maintained that she only 
participated in the bank robbery “under the threat of bodily harm.”109  
The court primarily focused on the issue of her “requisite intent” at the 
time she committed the crimes.
110
  Hearst‟s defense counsel mainly 
introduced evidence in form of expert testimony.  For instance, counsel 
called three psychiatrists who testified that she was forced to participate 
in the robberies.
111
  Yet, Hearst took the stand as well.  She testified to 
“her atrocious and outrageous mistreatment in the closet where she was 
kept blindfolded for days without relief.”112 
Furthermore, the defense counsel claimed Hearst was 
brainwashed.
113
  It tried to analogize brainwashing with duress by 
showing that “Hearst was never a free agent or voluntary member of the 
SLA, up to and including the time of her arrest.”114  Moreover, Hearst‟s 
defense counsel tried to prove that Hearst had suffered from the 
Stockholm Syndrome.
115
  In addition to the defense counsel‟s evidence, 
expert “Dr. William Sargant, an English psychologist who interviewed 
Hearst before her trial,” maintained that Hearst had been brainwashed by 
her captors.
116
  He explained that Hearst was “broken” through “mental 
cruelty, sensory deprivation, malnutrition, threats of death and injury . . . 
.”117  He further stated that Hearst also experienced a “constant confusion 
 
104. Id. 
105. Linder, supra note 51. 
106. Id. 
107. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. at 1071.  Altogether, “the State of California filed 
nineteen criminal charges against the defendant . . . .”  Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id.  In fact, requisite intent “became the sole issue of fact to be tried.”  Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. FBI Headline Archive, supra note 95. 
114. Linder, supra note 51. 
115. Id.  See discussion infra Part II.B. (exploring the definition of Stockholm 
Syndrome).  
116. Warburton, supra note 3, at 74. 
117. Id. 
13
1350 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:4 
of affection and abuse . . . .”118 
To rebut the defense counsel‟s evidence, the Government called its 
own experts.
119
  It called two psychiatrists to testify that Hearst “was not 
coerced but performed her acts voluntarily.”120  Furthermore, the 
prosecution called “Tom Matthews, one of the men whom Ms. Hearst . . . 
had kidnapped in Los Angeles . . . .”121  Matthews testified about 
Hearst‟s “voluntary role” in the crimes and how she acknowledged to 
him that she was participating freely.
122
  The prosecution also pointed out 
Hearst‟s flawed testimony.  For instance, Hearst claimed to be raped by 
one of the SLA members; however, she also kept a gift from him in her 
purse.
123
  Yet, the most influential testimony was by psychiatrist Joel 
Fort.  He testified to Hearst‟s character and her past behavior.124  Fort 
asserted that Hearst previously lied in school, “engaged in sexual activity 
at an early age, and experimented with drugs such as LSD.”125  
Additionally, he stated that the SLA had many members who were 
affluent and educated.
126
  As a result, Fort concluded that “Hearst would 
find the SLA appealing.”127 
In the end, the jury had to decide whom to believe.  After 
deliberation, the jury found Hearst guilty.
128
  On the issue of “requisite 
intent,”129 the jury found that “Hearst had participated freely in the 
robbery and did not believe the coercion theory presented by her 
defense.”130  Hearst received a prison sentence of seven years.131  After 
almost two years imprisonment, “President Carter commuted her 
sentence.”132  Then, on January 20, 2001, President Clinton pardoned 
 
118. Id. 
119. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Linder, supra note 51. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. (“Fort offered his „velcro theory‟ for aimless, lost souls such at [sic] Hearst: 
such persons, he said, float around in moral space and then find stuck to them the first 
random ideology they bump into.”)  
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
129. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
130. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. at 1072. 
131. Id. (“On September 24, 1976, this Court sentenced petitioner to seven years on 
Count I, for armed bank robbery, and to two years on Count II, for use of a weapon to 
commit a felony, the sentences to be served concurrently.”)  Id. 
132. FBI Headline Archive, supra note 95. 
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Patricia Hearst.
133
 
 
D. The D.C. Sniper Case 
 
Another high-profile case that involved the brainwashing defense is 
commonly referred to as the D.C. sniper case.
134
  Although the defense 
approached the brainwashing defense from a different angle, it also was 
not successful.  The facts are crucial to understand the use of the defense.  
Lee Boyd Malvo was a fifteen-year-old boy from Jamaica.  After being 
abandoned by his mother, Muhammad, a retired army veteran, brought 
Malvo from Jamaica to the United States in 2001.  This is when the 
indoctrination process began.
135
  In the United States, “Muhammad filled 
the teen‟s head with visions of an impending race war and trained Malvo 
in marksmanship.”136  Malvo learned how to use “an AK47, a 270 rifle, 
and a 306 rifle.”137  In addition, “[h]e isolated Malvo, steeped him to his 
own idiosyncratic, vitriolic brand of Islam and imposed a strict diet and 
exercise regimen on his „adopted‟ son.”138  For about a month, 
Muhammad and Malvo drove around the D.C. area and shot thirteen 
people, from the trunk of a car, leaving ten dead.
139
  Specifically, Malvo 
was charged with killing FBI analyst Linda Franklin “outside a Home 
Depot in Falls Church, Virginia, on October 14, 2002.”140  Though not 
proven, Muhammad and Malvo were also believed to be involved with 
shootings in other states, such as Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, Arizona, 
and Washington.
141
 
Malvo‟s defense counsel followed the unusual path of Hearst‟s 
counsel and claimed that Malvo had been brainwashed by Muhammad.
142
  
 
133. Linder, supra note 51. 
134. Muhammad v. State, 934 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). 
135. Id.  See also Carlin Flora, The Brainwashing Defense, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 
9, 2003, http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-20031209-000001.html. 
136. Flora, supra note 135. 
137. Muhammad, 934 A.2d at 1077. 
138. Flora, supra note 135. 
139. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, CNN LAW CENTER, May 5, 
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/10/sniper.malvo/index.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2009). 
140. Id. 
141. Malvo Gets Life Sentence in Sniper Killing, CNN LAW CENTER, Oct. 27, 2004, 
http://111.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/26/malvo.plea/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2009). 
142. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, supra note 139.  See also 
Oswald v. Bertrand, where, in a murder trial, a son unsuccessfully pleaded “that he was 
brainwashed by his father into committing the crimes.”  374 F.3d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 
2004).  The court, however, ruled that: 
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Instead of associating brainwashing with the duress defense, Malvo‟s 
counsel related it to the insanity defense.  Experts at trial compared the 
teenage boy to a child soldier or a cult member.
143
  For instance, the 
relationship between Malvo and Muhammad was equated to the 
relationship between a cult member and a cult leader or a child soldier 
and a warlord.
144
  These experts concluded that, as a result, “Malvo lost 
all sense of morality, all sense of identity, and became little more than an 
extension of Mr. Muhammad [sic] ego.”145  Furthermore, Dr. Neil 
Blumberg, a forensic psychiatrist, testified at trial that “Mr. Muhammad 
trained Mr. Malvo to be a soldier „in his war against America . . . .‟”146 
The defense counsel‟s experts also testified to the brainwashing 
process that took place.  They explained that Malvo “suffered from 
dissociative disorder.”147  According to Dr. Blumberg and other experts, 
Muhammad used indoctrination “techniques . . . including isolating 
[Malvo], controlling his diet and sleep, forcing him to watch violent 
videos, training him to use guns and teaching him a violent brand of 
Islam and black separatism.”148  Muhammad‟s brainwashing completely 
“broke down [Malvo‟s] already shaky sense of self and made him unable 
to resist Mr. Muhammad‟s commands.”149  Moreover, Malvo reached the 
breaking point that led to his “identity crisis” and loss of who he was.150  
He was merely Muhammad‟s puppet and his sense of right and wrong 
was blurred.
151
  However, the defense counsel‟s experts admitted that 
 
 
[i]f brainwashing is just a form . . . of the defense of coercion, it is 
barred by the conspirator exception; if brainwashing is a separate 
defense, it probably is not recognized by the law; and if it is merely 
an effort to show that Oswald was somehow incapable of forming an 
intent to kill, it would be highly unlikely to persuade a jury.  
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
143. Dao, supra note 4. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. (stating that Muhammad took advantage of “Malvo‟s hunger for a father 
figure . . . .”).   
147. Id.  Dissociative disorder means that the indoctrination “turned Malvo into an 
automaton-victim, who could neither resist nor sanely understand the nature of his acts.” 
EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY FOR THE COURTS 190 (Mark Costanzo et al., eds., 
2006). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Layton, supra note 23. 
151. Dao, supra note 4. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/11
2010] LOSING YOUR HEAD IN THE WASHER 1353 
Malvo “was clinically depressed, even suicidal.”152 
The prosecution focused on Malvo‟s suicidal notions and argued 
that suicide was “evidence that he knew that those plans were horribly 
wrong.”153  Additionally, the prosecution‟s experts concluded that Malvo 
knew that what he was doing was wrong.  The experts rather equated 
Malvo‟s “sniper missions” with depraved indifference murder and 
thought that his childhood experiences of “neglect and abuse” could not 
be considered an excuse for his actions.
154
  Besides denying that Malvo 
had an impaired mind, the prosecution also focused on Malvo‟s 
voluntary actions.  The prosecution claimed that “Malvo voluntarily 
chose to be with Mr. Muhammad, that the so-called indoctrination lasted 
just a few weeks and could not have completely impaired his faculties 
and that he was predisposed toward antisocial behavior.”155 
As in many insanity cases, the jury also rejected the defense 
counsel‟s brainwashing theory.  The jury did not believe that Muhammad 
had indoctrinated Malvo to the point that he could not distinguish 
between right and wrong.
156
  As a result, the jury found Malvo guilty of 
murder and Malvo received a life sentence.
157
  Following this trial, 
Malvo entered a guilty plea for the killings in Virginia and Montgomery 
County, Maryland.
158
  In addition, he agreed to cooperate with the 
prosecution and testify against Muhammad at trial.
159
 
 
III.  The Brainwashing Defense Should Be Adopted into the  
Model Penal Code Under the Insanity Defense 
 
The idea that certain acts should be criminalized and punished 
mirrors our society‟s demand for certain acceptable behavioral 
standards.
160
  In our society, this decision has long been one of moral 
character.
161
  The public‟s reaction to the outcome in the Hearst trial 
 
152. Id. 
153. Id. (“Mr. Malvo has on several occasions expressed revulsion or reservations 
about Mr. Muhammad‟s violent plans . . . .”).  
154. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, supra note 139. 
155. Dao, supra note 4. 
156. Ahlers, supra note 12. 
157. Id. 
158. Muhammad v. State, 934 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).  Malvo 
pled guilty to first-degree murder and was “sentenced to six consecutive life sentences 
without the possibility of parole.”  Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Delgado, supra note 1, at n.30. 
161. Id.  “The indoctrination desensitized Mr. Malvo to violence . . . .”  Dao, supra 
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demonstrates this notion.  For example, in 1975, before all of the details 
of Hearst‟s kidnapping and “brainwashing” were disclosed, “about 
ninety percent of the general public believed that Patricia Hearst was 
guilty and should be sentenced to prison.”162  Yet, after more details were 
released, “nearly one-half of the public favored parole or pardon.”163  
The public‟s view of Hearst‟s situation showed that morally, it felt that 
Hearst‟s action should be excused.  Especially after Hearst‟s kidnappers 
pleaded guilty to the kidnapping, the public realized that “Hearst was 
blameless” for becoming part of the SLA.164 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming evidence at trial against Hearst‟s 
theory of brainwashing was evident.  Hearst‟s lawyers could not prove 
that she was still under duress while she committed the crime.  Though 
her seven-year sentence was later pardoned, Hearst‟s strategy of placing 
brainwashing under the duress defense did not play out in her favor.  The 
lawyers in the D.C. sniper case learned from the Hearst outcome and 
tried a different strategy.  “By trying to equate brainwashing with mental 
illness, Mr. Malvo‟s lawyers have pushed the boundaries of the insanity 
defense into a gray area where precedents are few and obstacles to 
winning an acquittal are high, legal experts said.”165 
Although the psychological community is not in agreement about 
whether brainwashing is a mental disease or defect, it has recognized the 
Stockholm Syndrome.  Therefore, as previously mentioned, 
brainwashing should be categorized as a mental disease as well.  The 
idea set forth in the D.C. sniper case shows that brainwashed people 
cannot distinguish between right and wrong.  A brainwashed defendant 
may testify that, at the time he committed the crime, he “„felt‟ the 
decision to be his own” and that “he was acting of his own free will.”166  
As a result, the mens rea of the brainwashed person becomes irrelevant.  
Though the defendant is conscious of what he is doing, he thinks he is 
doing the right thing.  Consequently, brainwashing should be placed 
under the insanity defense and not under the duress defense. 
 
 
note 4. 
162. Delgado, supra note 1, at n.31. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Dao, supra note 4. 
166. Delgado, supra note 1, at 26. 
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A. Proposed Elements for the Brainwashing Defense 
 
The elements of the insanity defense include “[a] mental disease or 
defect” and the lack of “substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 
the requirements of law.”167  The brainwashing elements are similar.  
However, contrary to the insanity defense, brainwashing must be done by 
an external force.  The defendant must be associated with an 
indoctrinator.  For example, through emotional or physical control, the 
indoctrinator must substantially impair the defendant‟s mind.  This 
would satisfy the mental disease or defect element of the insanity 
defense.  Then, the defendant must be acting in furtherance of the 
indoctrinator‟s vision; the defendant‟s actions must be aligned with the 
goal of the indoctrinator.  As a result, the defendant knowingly commits 
the offense; however, he cannot comprehend that his act was wrong. 
Consequently, the proposed Model Penal Code provision for 
brainwashing would read as follows: “(1) A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of a mental 
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity . . . to appreciate the 
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct. . .;”168 (2) A mental disease or 
defect must be the result of an indoctrinator substantially impairing a 
person‟s mind; and (3) A person is acting in furtherance of the 
indoctrinator‟s vision and goals. 
 
B. Criticism of the Brainwashing Defense 
 
The brainwashing defense has yet to be successful in court.  
Naturally, judges are hesitant to admit evidence in support of 
brainwashing because it is not a recognized defense.  By introducing 
brainwashing under the duress and insanity defenses, brainwashing 
evidence has been presented in courts.  Some critics voice their concern 
of too much psychiatric influence in the American Criminal Justice 
System.
169
  In addition to the “„anti-psychiatry‟ school,”170 critics are 
troubled with the notion that brainwashing is not accepted as a scientific 
theory by, for example, the American Psychological Association.
171
  
 
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001). 
168. Id.  
169. Delgado, supra note 1, at 23-24. 
170. Id. 
171. See Introvigne, supra note 34. 
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Nevertheless, brainwashing should stand as a valid legal concept without 
the scientific basis because the insanity defense was also incorporated 
into law well “before a universally accepted scientific model was 
available.”172  Professor Delgado therefore concludes “that the scientific 
certainty has never been essential to the establishment of a legal 
defense.”173  Now, years after the defense has been successfully used in 
the courtroom, even the American Psychological Association and the 
American Psychiatric Association support the insanity defense as long as 
the defendant receives adequate treatment and society is not endangered 
if the defendant is let free.
174
  Furthermore, research has shown that 
“[m]embers of the lay public, who are potential jurors, hold beliefs that 
brainwashing is an effective psychological process . . . .”175  The first 
step is to have the general public recognize that brainwashing exists.  
The legal community should be next in recognizing brainwashing, even 
if the scientific community has not done so.  As a result, the lack of 
scientific recognition of brainwashing should not be an excuse in 
refusing to incorporate the brainwashing defense.  Perhaps the scientific 
community would even follow the legal example and acknowledge 
brainwashing as a scientific theory. 
Another criticism to the brainwashing defense is the role of the 
defendant‟s predisposition.  In the legal context, the role of a person‟s 
predisposition has not been resolved.
176
  Experts in both the Hearst and 
 
172. Delgado, supra note 1, at 24 (“Such a requirement is not realistic . . . [and] not 
observed in connection with the development of other mental defenses . . . .”). 
173. Id. 
174. THINKING ABOUT THE INSANITY DEFENSE 10-11 (Ellsworth Lapham Fersch ed., 
2005). 
175. Warburton, supra note 3, at 79 (quoting John S. DeWitt et al., Novel Scientific 
Evidence and Controversial Cases: A Social Psychological Examination, 21 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
One survey of 383 randomly-drawn registered voters revealed that 
over three-quarters of those questioned said they believed 
brainwashing occurs.  In response to the statement “A person can be 
brainwashed, even if they are not actually held captive against their 
will,” nearly seventy-eight percent said they agreed, while twenty-
one percent disagreed.  Also, about thirty percent of those 
interviewed agreed with the statement “Brainwashing is required to 
make someone join a religious cult.” 
 
John S. DeWitt et al., Novel Scientific Evidence and Controversial Cases: A Social 
Psychological Examination, 21 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 7 (1997). 
176. James T. Richardson, “Brainwashing” Claims and Minority Religions Outside 
the United States: Cultural Diffusion of a Questionable Concept in the Legal Arena, 1996 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 873, 879 (1996). 
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D.C. sniper cases touched upon the defendant‟s predisposition.  
Proponents of brainwashing sometimes ignore that some people have 
“predisposing characteristics.”177  In Hearst, the prosecution brought 
forth evidence that Hearst was predisposed to joining the SLA and even 
found the group appealing.
178
  In the D.C. sniper case, the prosecution 
touched upon Malvo‟s abusive childhood and his mother‟s abandonment 
as a reason for following Muhammad as his role model.
179
  The extreme 
view on predisposition is the “„psychoanalytical‟ objection.”180  The 
theory entails that “even an intense thought reform cannot convert a law-
abiding citizen into an outlaw.”181  Without some sort of predisposition, a 
person would not be prone to brainwashing.
182
  Proponents of the 
“psychoanalytical objection” do not believe in brainwashing because, in 
their view, a person can only be brainwashed when he or she has been 
predisposed to that kind of behavior.  However, there are also those 
experts that believe that anyone can be brainwashed.
183
  It should be up 
to a jury to decide what theory to believe and how much of a defendant‟s 
actions are attributable to predisposing characteristics.  In the end, the 
jury must decide whether or not a defendant was truly brainwashed. 
The main criticism of the brainwashing defense is that it is 
ineffective.  Since it is so difficult to prove that a person has been 
brainwashed, the defense is not used often at trial.  Ineffectiveness and 
rare usage are weak arguments because the insanity defense brings about 
the same qualities.  Acknowledging that “[b]rainwashing is poised to 
take its place within the legal justice system,” the brainwashing theory 
has been proposed as a mitigating factor instead of a complete defense.
184
  
The idea is that, despite the failure of the defense “during the 
guilt/innocence phase,” a jury can take into account the same factors 
during the “sentencing phase” for mitigation purposes.185  The same 
approach has been used in insanity cases.  In several jurisdictions juries 
are able to consider mitigating factors “such as psychological 
 
177. Id. 
178. Linder, supra note 51. 
179. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, supra note 139. 
180. Delgado, supra note 1, at 24. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 24-25. 
183. Id. at 25 (“[T]hose psychologists and psychiatrists who are most intimately 
familiar with thought reform believe that virtually everyone can be induced to behave 
criminally if subjected to intensive thought reform in a totally controlled environment.”).  
184. See Warburton, supra note 3, at 97. 
185. Id. at 88-96. 
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impairment;”186 factors such as this may work to “reduce the offender‟s 
culpability but do[ ] not meet the threshold for acquittal under an insanity 
defense.”187  This is especially prevalent in capital offense cases.188  For 
example, the jury spared Malvo from the death sentence despite his 
admission to the heinous crimes.  Although this is a step in the right 
direction, it undermines the full capability of the brainwashing defense.  
Insanity has been a valid defense for many decades despite its low 
success rate and rare usage.  Thus, brainwashing should be available as a 
complete exculpating defense and, if the threshold cannot be met, should 
naturally be considered as a mitigating factor.  It is obvious that States 
that do not acknowledge the insanity defense should not acknowledge the 
brainwashing defense either.  In all other States, however, there is no 
valid reason not to adopt the brainwashing defense. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
Despite some of the valid criticisms, the brainwashing defense 
should be adopted into the Model Penal Code and associated with the 
insanity defense for two reasons.  First, brainwashing can be validly 
placed within the ABA‟s definition of a mental disease or defect.  
Second, it should not be associated with the duress defense.  Whereas 
brainwashed defendants commit crimes even after the initial stage of 
coercion, under the duress defense, coercion and the threat of bodily 
harm must be imminent.  
Brainwashing can be a complete defense to a crime and should not 
be regarded merely as a mitigating factor.  Rather than viewing the 
 
186. Robert F. Schopp, Two-Edged Swords, Dangerousness, and Expert Testimony 
in Capital Sentencing, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 83 (2006). 
187. Id. 
188. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(b), (f), (g) (2001).  The mitigating 
circumstances are: 
 
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
. . . 
(f) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of 
another person. 
(g) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a 
result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.   
 
Id. 
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brainwashed person as a perpetrator, he should be viewed as the victim 
because the indoctrinator completely controlled the person‟s mind and, 
therefore, his actions.  The goal of the brainwashing defense should be 
the rehabilitation of the defendant.  If necessary, rehabilitation should 
take place in an institution.  Most states already have laws in existence 
that will determine whether or not a defendant must be institutionalized.  
As in insanity cases, rehabilitation is emphasized because, under the 
theories of punishment, deterrence would not be beneficial. 
As previously mentioned, the proposed elements for the 
brainwashing defense that must be established are: “(1) A person is not 
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result 
of a mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity . . . to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct;. . . (2) A mental 
disease or defect must be the result of an indoctrinator substantially 
impairing a person‟s mind; and (3) A person is acting in furtherance of 
the indoctrinator‟s vision and goals.”189  Though it is a stringent test to 
meet, it is possible.  In the end, although it is the jury‟s decision whom to 
believe, the defendant should have the option to plead “not guilty” by 
reason of brainwashing. 
 
 
       189. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (2001). 
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